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Financial Deregulation and 
Competition in Korea 
Moon-Soo Kang 
9.1 Introduction 
The financial system in Korea has been undergoing structural changes 
as a result of financial reform and technological innovation. The financial 
liberalization and internationalization currently in progress may be re- 
garded as deregulation undertaken by the government in response to the 
needs of financial institutions for financial innovation, and to deal with 
international pressures and friction resulting from new economic and f i -  
nancial conditions. 
Since the early 1980s, the government has gradually changed its policy 
direction regarding the overall management of the national economy 
toward a more market-oriented approach. This change regarding the man- 
agement of the national economy initiated the liberalization of financial 
policy. Democratization has also accentuated demands for faster financial 
market deregulation. 
Financial deregulation in Korea has been a very cautious and slow pro- 
cess. The authorities have pursued a policy of gradualism in order to give 
less competitive financial institutions enough time to adjust to a more 
competitive environment in financial markets. The less competitive institu- 
tions include some nationwide commercial banks with a heavy burden of 
nonperforming assets that had been incurred by bank support for industry 
rationalization and worsened by the recent economic downturn (see Nam 
1994, 184-222). Furthermore, fifteen nationwide commercial banks re- 
corded huge capital losses of 4.5 trillion won in stock investments at the 
end of 1996 as equity prices declined. Eight investment trust companies 
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also suffered from heavy capital losses of 1.8 trillion won in equity invest- 
ments at the end of March 1997. Given the commercial banks’ weakened 
loan portfolios, it was feared that complete freedom in the determination 
of bank lending and deposit rates would lead to cutthroat interest rate 
competition among banks and nonbank financial institutions, with subse- 
quent undue pressures on interest margins, bank profits, and capital ade- 
quacy ratios. 
Some market observers, disappointed in the slow financial deregulation 
process, think that “big bang” full liberalization might solve many problems 
in the financial markets in a single stroke, whereas government authorities 
have pursued gradual deregulation and have favored restructuring financial 
institutions in several steps to reduce shocks and uncertainties in the fi- 
nancial markets. At the end of 1995, the government introduced a four- 
year program, the Revision to the Foreign Exchange Reform Plan, to lib- 
eralize capital movements (see OECD 1996, 58-62). The plan includes 
specific measures and a timetable for implementation. It not only covers 
long-term capital transactions but also extends the deregulation of short- 
term capital transactions. In early 1997 the government established the 
Presidential Commission for Financial Reform, which plans to recom- 
mend a big-bang-type full liberalization to the government. 
The Hanbo scandal in early 1997 exposed the vulnerability of the Ko- 
rean financial system by pushing a couple of nationwide commercial 
banks and dozens of nonbank financial institutions to the wall. The scan- 
dal triggered a general public outcry for a comprehensive overhaul of the 
outdated and inefficient financial system. A sense of urgency has perme- 
ated the government’s determination to make these changes, with the full- 
fledged market opening looming large after Korea’s accession to the 
OECD in December 1996 (Kim 1997,4). Before allowing firms to borrow 
freely from international capital markets and implementing external liber- 
alization, the government should fully liberalize the national financial 
market. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the financial deregulation process 
and its consequences in Korea’s financial sector. 
9.2 Interest Rate Deregulation 
9.2.1 Interest Rate Liberalization 
The government implemented the first plan for interest rate deregula- 
tion in December 1988, when most bank and nonbank lending rates and 
some long-term deposit rates, except for those on policy loans, and short- 
term deposit rates were liberalized. After only about six months, however, 
the government and the business sector became so concerned about the 
rise in interest rates that the government again intervened in the financial 
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market, giving tacit consent for financial institutions to collude on interest 
rates. The interest rate jumps were not directly caused by the deregulation 
itself but rather by the tight monetary policy being pursued. Thus the first 
attempt at interest rate deregulation was abandoned and caused some con- 
fusion among market participants. 
It has become increasingly necessary to liberalize interest rates and rein- 
force the market mechanism, thereby improving the efficiency of the finan- 
cial markets as well as the competitiveness of domestic financial institu- 
tions. Interest rate deregulation was pursued to handle difficult situations 
effectively with the global trend of financial liberalization and integration. 
The government announced a gradual interest rate deregulation plan in 
August 1991 (table 9.1). This was the second attempt at deregulating inter- 
est rates. The first step of the four-stage interest rate deregulation plan 
went into effect in November 1991. Interest rates have been gradually lib- 
eralized in accordance with developments in the economy as well as in 
financial markets (fig. 9.1). There has been an attempt to keep a proper 
balance between the deregulation of deposit and loan rates among differ- 
ent financial products and among different areas of the financial sector in 
order to minimize any disruption of the financial market’s overall stability. 
In comparison to deposit rates, lending rates have been deregulated rela- 
tively faster since they influence fund allocation. Regarding deposit rates, 
those on large, long-term deposits have been liberalized first to deter an 
abrupt shift of funds across different financial sectors and to encourage 
long-term deposits. Under the four-stage approach, demand deposit rates 
will not be fully deregulated until 1997. The desire of the government and 
the Bank of Korea to save on borrowing costs as they issue debt instru- 
ments is one of the factors that has contributed to the cautious approach 
toward interest rate deregulation. Monetary authorities do not want to be 
blamed for instigating a rise in interest rates when they implement the 
four-phase interest rate deregulation plan. 
9.2.2 Behavior of Bank Lending Rates after Deregulation 
Just after the deregulation of bank lending rates, lending rates on bank 
overdrafts and discount rates on commercial bills started to rise between 
0.5 and 3.0 percent, reflecting excess demand for bank credit, though these 
rates then began to drop gradually. Minimum lending rates and maximum 
rates on general bank loans, however, declined by between 1.5 and 0.5 
percent, respectively, just after the deregulation in November 1993. The 
bank lending rate band between the maximum rate and the minimum rate 
widened to 6.50 percent at the end of February 1997 from 2.5 percent at 
the end of 1991 (table 9.2). 
Commercial banks’ prime lending rates did not move flexibly reflecting 
market conditions after the deregulation of interest rates. Prime rates of 
commercial banks are linked to the average funding cost of banks. As of 
Table 9.1 Schedule for Interest Rate Deregulation and Implementation of Selected Measures 
Step Loans Deposits Bonds 
Deregulation of 
Financial Instruments 
Step 1: second half of 
1991 to first half of 
1992 discounts excluding 
Bank overdraft loan 
Real commercial bill 
those rediscounted by 
Bank of Korea 
(BOK) 
Short-term finance 
companies’ 
commercial paper 
and trade bill 
discounts 
Step 2: second half of 
1992 to end of 1993 
All loans of banks and 
nonbank financial 
institutions, excluding 
loans financed by 
government and BOK 
rediscount 
Negotiable bank 
Short-term finance 
certificates of deposit 
companies’ sale of 
large-size commercial 
papers and trade bills 
Banks’ sale of large-size 
real commercial bills 
Large-size repurchase 
agreements 
Some long-term 
deposits 
Long-term deposits 
with maturities over 
two years 
Corporate bonds with 
maturities over two 
years 
Corporate bonds with 
maturities less than 
two years 
Bank debentures with 
maturities over two 
years 
Auction sales of 
monetary 
stabilization bonds 
and treasury bonds 
(March 1993) 
Diversification of short- 
term instruments 
(ongoing) 
Easing of restrictions on 
short-term financial 
instruments 
(maturities and issue 
limit; ongoing) 
Step 3: 1994-96 
Step 4: 1997- 
Loans financed by Deposits with maturities Bank debentures with 
government and BOK less than two years maturities less than 
rediscount (except demand two years 
deposits) Monetary stabilization 
short-term market- 
oriented products 
financial products 
linked to market rates 
such as money 
market certificates 
Further deregulation of bonds 
Introduction of 
1997: Preparation of 
plan for phased 
deregulation of 
remaining regulated 
interest rates on 
demand deposits and 
preferential and 
company saving 
deposits with 
maturities of less than 
three months 
All government and 
public bonds 
Authorization of new 
short-term products, 
including money 
market certificates 
and money market 
funds 
1997: Study on 
abolishing restrictions 
on short-term 
instruments 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (1991). 
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Fig. 9.1 Nominal interest rates 
Note: MSB = monetary stabilization bond; YCR = yield on corporate bond. 
June 1996, the major commercial banks seem to determine their prime 
rates based on the following formula (see H. Kim 1996, 22-47) 
(1) Prime rate = Average funding cost + Interest margin 
- Spread band widthl2. 
In general, since deregulation, the five major nationwide commercial 
banks change their prime rates first and then other banks tend to follow 
them passively (table 9.3). It appears that smaller and regional banks do 
not have the ability to determine their own rates and do not have a proper 
risk management system installed. Therefore, they do not want to differ- 
entiate themselves much from major leading banks in the financial market. 
Commercial banks tend to adjust their average lending rates, not by fre- 
quently changing prime rates, but by changing interest spreads offered 
to customers. 
9.3 Competition in Banking Markets 
9.3.1 Changes in Bank Loan Portfolios 
A significant change occurred in bank loan portfolios when phase 2 of 
the interest rate deregulation plan was implemented. The share of loans to 
Table 9.2 Bank Lending Rate Movements after Deregulation (percent per annum) 
Deregulation 
February 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Phase 1: November 1991 
Phase 1: November 1991 
Phase 2: November 1993 
Phase 3: December 1994, July 1995, 
November 1996 
BOK loans with aggregate credit 
Overdrafts 10.0-13.0 12.0-15.5 10.25-15.0 9.5-13.5 10.0-14.5 11.7-15.5 14.3-16.5 13.4-14.3 
Discount on commercial bills 10.0-13.0 12.0- 5.5 10.2-15.0 8.5-12.5 8.5-12.5 9.0-12.5 8.5-14.75 8.25-14.75 
General loans 10.0-13.0 10.0- 3.0 10.0-13.0 8.5-12.5 8.5--12.5 9.0- 12.5 8.5-14.75 8.25-14.75 
ceiling 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.5 8.5-9.5 9.0-11.0 8.75-11.0 8.25-14.75 
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin (various issues). 
Table 9.3 Bank Prime Rates and Dates of Change: Leaders and Followers, after April 1996 
Prime Rate 23 April 25 April 2 May 7 May 8 May 10 May 23 May 
(“w 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 
8.75 Top eight banksa Koram Bank 
9.0 Donghwa Bank, Hana Bank Daegu Bank, Kyongnam 
9.25 Kwangju Pusan Bank Chungchong Dongnam 
Boram Bank Peace Bank Bank 
Bank Bank Bank 
Source: H. Kim (1996). 
*Includes Chohung Bank, Commercial Bank of Korea, Korea First Bank, Hanil Bank, Seoul Bank, Korea Exchange Bank, Shinhan Bank, and Citizen’s 
National Bank. 
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Fig. 9.2 Shares of small and medium-size enterprise (SME) loans and average 
lending rates of banks 
big firms in the loan portfolios of nationwide commercial banks declined 
considerably, as big firms relied more heavily on funding through securi- 
ties and the bond market. 
On the other hand, the share of loans to small and medium-size firms 
showed steady growth (fig. 9.2). The share of loans to households rose 
sharply after interest rate deregulation. Commercial banks have expanded 
loans to households and small and medium-size firms, to whom relatively 
high lending rates were applied. 
9.3.2 Interest Rate Margins 
Next, we investigate the interest rate margin trend in the banking sector. 
The interest rate margin could be used as an indicator to measure the 
degree of financial deregulation and competition in the banking market. 
More competition stemming from a more liberalized financial system will 
tend to reduce the margin; a bigger margin could be taken as an indicator 
of a lower degree of financial liberalization. 
Interest rate margins of nationwide commercial banks, which measure 
the difference between the average lending and deposit rates in a given 
year, came down quite strikingly between 1990 and 1994 (table 9.4). This 
margin squeeze reflects increased competitive pressures in the bank de- 
posit market that brought about a sharp increase in the average deposit 
rate after the deregulation of interest rates (fig. 9.3). Interest rate margins 
of regional banks, however, did not come down as much. This reflects the 
fact that competitive pressures in the regional banking market are weaker 
than in the nationwide banking market due to restrictions on the expan- 
sion of bank branches. It also reflects the fact that regional banks kept 
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Table 9.4 Interest Rate Margins of Banks (percent) 
Nationwide 
Five Major Commercial Regional Commercial 
Banks Banks Banks Banks 
1988 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
Ave. lending rate 
Ave. deposit rate 
Margin 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
9.14 
5.65 
3.49 
J0.28 
5.76 
4.52 
10.37 
6.10 
4.27 
9.83 
7.95 
1.88 
10.28 
8.36 
1.92 
8.73 
7.30 
1.42 
9.39 
7.52 
1.87 
10.41 
7.71 
2.70 
9.41 1 1.54 
5.74 6.70 
3.67 4.84 
10.14 12.13 
5.80 6.12 
4.34 6.01 
10.48 11.94 
6.23 6.15 
4.25 5.79 
9.93 11.65 
8.15 7.86 
1.78 3.79 
10.49 12.22 
8.70 8.22 
1.79 3.99 
9.00 10.91 
7.58 7.00 
1.42 3.90 
9.60 11.23 
1.77 7.03 
1.83 4.20 
10.65 11.61 
7.88 7.40 
2.77 4.21 
9.79 
5.95 
3.84 
10.48 
5.87 
4.61 
10.74 
6.21 
4.53 
10.28 
8.08 
2.20 
10.82 
8.59 
2.24 
9.36 
7.45 
1.91 
9.91 
7.61 
2.30 
10.82 
7.79 
3.02 
Source: Bank of Korea (1995). 
extending many more loans to small and medium-size firms than nation- 
wide commercial banks. 
9.3.3 Branching 
The authorities have maintained controls on the expansion of bank 
branches in the fear that freedom in bank branching would favor the con- 
centration process. As part of the financial deregulation policies that fos- 
ter competition through easier market access, the government has gradu- 
ally deregulated the expansion of branch networks. The Committee for 
Harmonization of Bank Branching was abolished in 1994, and restrictions 
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Table 9.5 Expansion of Branch Networks of Commercial Banks 
Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
- 
Nationwide commercial 1,695 1,931 2,149 2,425 2,681 3,476 
banks (A) (13.9) (11.3) (12.8) (10.6) (29.3) 
Regional banks (B) 638 746 818 892 1,001 1,081 
(16.9) (9.7) (9.0) (12.2) (8.0) 
Commercial banks (A + B) 2,333 2,677 2,967 3,317 3,682 4,557 
(14.7) (10.8) (11.8) (11.0) (23.8) 
Foreign banksa 94 94 96 98 95 96 
Source, Bank of Korea (1996). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are rates of increase (percent) over previous year 
nIncludes number of branches and representative offices. 
3,891 
(11.9) 
1,214 
(12.3) 
5,105 
(12.0) 
91 
- 
on bank branching were lessened. The banks themselves now decide the 
number of branches that are profitable to operate. In 1995, commercial 
banks-in particular, nationwide commercial banks-aggressively ex- 
panded their branch networks to strengthen their retail operations (table 
This growth has helped to intensify competition and improve the effi- 
ciency of local financial markets that were often characterized by a high 
degree of concentration. Freedom to open more branches, however, en- 
abled the large nationwide commercial banks to expand their institutional 
dominance at the expense of smaller local savings institutions and regional 
banks (table 9.6). These fears prompted regional banks to ask the govern- 
ment to ease territorial restrictions against them. Regional banks are not 
allowed to open more than ten branches in Seoul and two branches in 
large cities in provinces other than their home provinces. 
Foreign banks, except Citibank, have not expanded their branch net- 
works yet. They do not seem to have strong interest in the retail banking 
9.5). 
Table 9.6 Deposits and Assets of Commercial Banks (billion won, period average) 
Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Nationwide commercial 41,585.9 
banks (A) (82.1) 
Regional banks (B) 9,093.2 
(17.9) 
Commercial banks (A + B) 50,679.1 
(100.0) 
Foreign banks - 
Total 50,679.1 
(100.0) 
52,152.9 
12,147.1 
(18.9) 
64,300.0 
( 100.0) 
(81.1) 
64,300.0 
(100.0) 
Deposits” 
60,122.3 
(81.6) 
13,524.9 
(18.4) 
73,647.2 
(100.0) 
- 
73,647.2 
(100.0) 
68,593.7 
14,540.7 
(17.1) 
83,134.4 
(98.0) 
1,715.1 
(2.0) 
84,849.5 
(100.0) 
(80.8) 
74,518.9 
(79.8) 
17,164.9 
(18.4) 
91,683.5 
(98.1) 
1,750.9 
(1.9) 
93,434.4 
(1 00.0) 
117,097.1 
(83.8) 
20,860.8 
(14.9) 
137,957.9 
(98.7) 
1,756.0 
(1.3) 
139,7 13.9 
( 100.0) 
137,715.7 
(84.0) 
24,523.3 
(14.9) 
162,239.0 
(98.9) 
1,800.7 
(1.1) 
164,039.7 
(100.0) 
Assets 
~~ 
Nationwide commercial 96,494 9 
banks (A) (85 77) 
Regional banks (B) 16,007 0 
(14 23) 
Commercial banks (A + B) 112,501.9 
(100 0) 
Foreign banks 
Total 112,501.9 
(100.0) 
119,201.0 
(85.37) 
20,421 .O 
(14.63) 
139,622.0 
(100.0) 
- 
139,622.0 
(100.0) 
144,278.7 
(86.17) 
23,147.9 
(13.83) 
167,426.6 
(100.0) 
- 
167,426.6 
(100.0) 
172,323.3 
(8 1 .OO) 
26,164.7 
(12.30) 
198,488.0 
(93.30) 
14,246.8 
(6.70) 
212,734.8 
(100.0) 
217,620.2 
(81.84) 
32,651.7 
(12.28) 
250,271.9 
15,630.5 
(5.88) 
265,902.4 
(100.0) 
(94.12) 
299,036.8 
(82.90) 
41,506.2 
(11.51) 
340,543.0 
(94.41) 
20,161.7 
(5.59) 
360,704.7 
(100.0) 
363,950.7 
(82.85) 
51,487.1 
(11.72) 
415,437.8 
(94.57) 
23,861.3 
(5.43) 
( 100.0) 
439,299.1 
Source: Bank of Korea (1997). 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are composition ratios. 
“Includes deposits and certificates of deposit. 
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business because of the high cost of building a retail network and the 
regulation of capital movements in Korea.' More foreign banks, however, 
may enter the retail banking business when the Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment is signed by the OECD member countries. 
9.3.4 
Banking market structure studies apply the structure-performance hy- 
pothesis to the banking industry. According to the hypothesis, the degree 
of competition among banks is influenced by the degree of concentration 
of output among a few relatively large banks, since a more highly concen- 
trated market structure is assumed to be conducive to more effective collu- 
sion. The measures of performance, used as indicators of the degree of 
competition among banks, include bank profit rates, lending interest rates, 
and bank deposit rates (see Gilbert 1984, 617-45). 
The structure-performance hypothesis implies that there may exist a 
positive correlation between market concentration and performance. 
Bank lending rates are influenced by the market structure of the banking 
industry. According to Jacobs (1971) and Rhoades (1982), bank lending 
interest rates tend to rise when there is a rise in the market concentration 
ratio. Thus market concentration seems to have a significant influence on 
bank lending interest rates. 
We apply the structure-performance hypothesis to the banking industry 
in Korea. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), better known 
as the Herfindahl index, to measure the degree of concentration of output 
in banking markets in Korea. Because of the importance attached to mar- 
ket concentration as an indicator of competition and the relative ease of 
calculating the Herfindahl index, this index serves as an efficient screening 
tool for regulators. The guidelines of the U.S. Justice Department, as ap- 
plied to the banking industry, specify that if a bank merger would result 
(1) in a postmerger HHI in a market of less than 1,800 or ( 2 )  in a change 
in the HHI of less than 200, it is likely that the market structure would 
not reach a concentration level high enough or the concentration would 
not increase enough to give firms in the market the power to maintain 
prices above the competitive level for a significant period (see Rhoades 
1993, 188-89). 
After interest rates were deregulated in November 1991, the market con- 
centration ratio in the banking industry, measured by the HHI, steadily 
declined to 716 at the end of 1996 from 917 at the end of 1990 (table 9.7). 
The market share of the top five commercial banks also declined steadily 
to 49.0 percent from 59.7 percent in 1990. These developments seem to 
reflect the entry of four new banks into the banking market and the homo- 
Market Concentration in the Banking Market 
1. In general, foreign exchange can only be purchased for approved purposes, primarily 
current account operations and permitted capital transactions. 
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Table 9.7 Market Concentration of Commercial Banks in Korea 
Measure and Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
Nationwidecommercial banks 863 803 777 736 684 678 675 
Regional banks 55 56 49 52 50 43 41 
All banks 917 859 826 788 735 722 716 
Top five banks 725 667 629 581 541 511 512 
Top five banks 59.7 57.3 55.7 53.4 51.7 49.1 49.0 
Market share (“YO) 
Note: Based on all won-denominated deposits at the end of the period. 
geneous competitive market structure. Commercial banks offer similar de- 
posit instruments to firms and households. 
Since the deregulation of interest rates, the strong traditional relation- 
ship between banks and large firms has weakened. The weight of bank 
loans in total funding by large firms has shown a substantial decline, as 
companies increased funding through the corporate bond and commercial 
paper markets. Bank loans to small and medium-size firms and house- 
holds have risen sharply to account for a larger share of overall loans. 
Commercial banks have adopted a new policy in determining lending 
rates; bank customers who consolidated their financial affairs at one bank 
started being offered favorable terms for loans and various kinds of free 
services such as tax consulting. Banks also began to put more emphasis 
on private banking. 
9.4 Financial Deregulation and Monetary Policy 
9.4.1 Monetary Policy 
The deregulation of financial markets and the modification of regula- 
tions governing financial instruments and financial institutions will re- 
quire changes in the operation of monetary policy, which is based on the 
monetary targeting of the broadly defined money supply, M2. The com- 
plete deregulation of interest rates in financial markets will necessitate a 
monetary control system based on interest rates. The Bank of Korea 
(BOK) frequently used repurchase agreements and monetary stabilization 
bonds (MSBs) for its daily operations. Changes in the operating proce- 
dures for monetary policy in the 1990s have led to reliance on the market- 
based allocation mechanism for open market instruments. The BOK re- 
introduced a system of auctions for the issuance of MSBs to nonbank 
financial intermediaries in April 1993 and applied it to banks as well in 
December 1995. Though very limited in size and frequency, sales of MSBs 
by auction to the general public, including nonbank financial intermediar- 
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Table 9.8 Open Market Operations of Monetary Stabilization Bonds (billion won) 
Operation 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Issuance 16,967 20,262 24,853 29,796 34,879 39,458 30,725 
Direct sale 1,575 4,918 10,468 18,917 25,045 27,215 7,019 
Auction and acceptance 15,392 15,344 14,385 10,879 9,834 12,243 23,706 
Redemption 9,768 22,327 18,085 25,858 33,740 38,974 31,520 
Outstanding 15,374 15,241 20,264 24,202 25,340 25,825 25,030 
OutstandinglM2 (Yn) 31.4 22.2 21.1 21.6 17.0 16.8 14.0 
Source: Bank of Korea, Annual Report (Seoul, various issues). 
ies, were tried by the BOK in 1998 and 1989 (Kang 1993, 201-25). The 
rate on MSBs issued by competitive bidding applies equally to all success- 
ful bidders through the Dutch auction method as with repurchase agree- 
ments. The level of discount rates of MSBs is slightly below market interest 
rates, reflecting the standing of the BOK. The direct sale rate to sixty-four 
primary dealers is set at a slightly lower rate than the competitive bidding 
rate (J. Kim 1996, 29-57); see table 9.8. However, mandatory allocations 
continue to be used to a considerable degree, particularly on special occa- 
sions, such as the allocation of MSBs in April 1997 to offset the effects of 
a cut in the reserve requirement ratio in February 1997. In order to reduce 
high reserve requirements, bank deposit reserve ratios were lowered in 
three steps from 11.5 percent in 1990 to 2.0 percent and 5.0 percent for 
demand deposits and savings deposits, respectively, in 1997 (see IMF 
1996,74). Cuts in deposit reserve ratios also helped to correct the compar- 
ative disadvantage of banks relative to nonbank financial intermediaries. 
Since 1989, the BOK has made greater use of the sale and purchase of 
government and public bonds under repurchase agreements in controlling 
the banks’ short-term liquidity. In 1995, about 80 percent of repurchases 
were implemented using auction-determined rates, the remainder being 
allocated administratively at slightly lower interest rates. Repurchase oper- 
ations involve some administrative allocations to banks (see OECD 1996, 
70). In order to reduce the banks’ access to the BOK’s rediscount facility, 
an overall ceiling on refinancing was introduced in 1994. The outstanding 
amount of BOK rediscounts was reduced to sterilize the effects of a cut in 
the deposit reserve ratio in 1997. 
In April 1996, the monetary authorities increased the statutory mini- 
mum maturity of bank trust accounts. Starting in May 1996, households 
and firms began to shift out of trust accounts and into bank savings depos- 
its and savings instruments offered by nonbank financial institutions. The 
portfolio shifts led to a sharp increase in the growth rate of M2. They did 
not, however, influence MCT and M3.2 The monetary authorities chose 
2. MCT comprises M2 plus certificates of deposit and trust accounts. 
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to implement a monetary targeting policy based on MCT rather than M2 
in 1997. 
9.4.2 Interest Rate Deregulation and the 
Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
The income velocity of M2 has fluctuated greatly due to changing regu- 
lations and improving transactions technology (fig. 9.4). In contrast, the 
income velocity of M3 has been more stable, with a standard deviation 
of 2.15 compared with a standard deviation of 2.64 for M2 during the 
1987--96 period. 
(2) 
In the above equation, MIP represents real money stock, Y the weighted 
average of savings and time deposit rates, y the industrial production in- 
dex, and u the error term. The Kalman filter is applied to update the co- 
efficient a,. Figure 9.5 delineates movements of the coefficient a,  for M2 
and M3. The interest rate elasticity of demand for M2 seemed to increase 
remarkably from 1992 due to interest rate deregulation and financial liber- 
alization. 
We attempt to estimate the relations, among money supply, output, the 
inflation rate, and the interest rate to examine whether there has been a 
significant change in the role of the interest rate in the monetary transmis- 
sion mechanism in Korea since interest deregulation in the early 1990s. 
Four variables are included in the vector autoregression (VAR) model: 
The money demand equation was specified as 
ln(MIP), = a ,  + a,lnr, + a,Iny, + a,ln(M/P),_,  + u,. 
q = C, + CP,q-, + u,, 
/ = I  
(3) 
where Y, is a 4 x 1 vector of endogenous variables, C, is a 4 X 1 vector 
of constant terms, the ps are 12 X 4 matrices of coefficients, and U, is a 
15 1 I 
year 
Fig. 9.4 Income velocity of money (percentage change) 
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Fig. 9.5 Interest rate elasticity of demand for money 
4 X 1 vector of disturbances. In this VAR model, twelve lags of each 
variable are included for estimation. Considering the endogeneity of 
money supply, we chose the following ordering among the four variables: 
the level of market interest rates, the CPI inflation rate, the industrial out- 
put growth rate, and the rate of increase in the money supply (M2; see 
Hahm and Lee 1997, 51-98). 
Based on the estimated coefficients, an impulse response function was 
used to appraise how the interest rate responds to various kinds of shocks 
to the economy. In addition, we endeavor to examine whether there is any 
evidence of change in the monetary transmission mechanism in light of 
the interest rate deregulation in 1991 and financial liberalization in the 
1990s. The sample was split at the end of 1991 (see IMF 1996). The speci- 
fied VAR model was estimated using monthly, seasonally adjusted time 
series for two sample periods: 1980: 1-96: 12 and 1980: 1-9 1 : 12. The three- 
year corporate bond yield was used as the market interest rate. The results 
were similar to those found by IMF studies (see IMF 1996). 
Interest rate responses to shocks in the money supply, inflation, and 
output growth are presented in figure 9.6. The solid lines represent the 
impulse responses based on the 1980: 1-96: 12 sample, and the dashed lines 
represent those based on the 198O:l-91:12 subsample. The results for the 
two different sample periods are generally similar. The main findings are 
described below. First, in response to an increase in money supply growth, 
the nominal interest rate begins to fall steadily in the first three months, 
with a lag of about two months, and then rises to its original level for the 
subsample period. The response of the interest rate to an increase in 
money supply growth is weaker for the whole sample period than for the 
subsample period. Second, a rise in inflation leads to a significant rise in 
-0.1 - 
-0.15 - 
month 
': 
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Fig. 9.6 Impulse response of corporate bond rate to contemporaneous shocks 
in economy 
Note: Response to shocks in ( A )  money supply, (E)  inflation rate, and ( C )  industrial output. 
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the nominal interest rate. Third, the response of the nominal interest rate 
to shocks in output growth shows a procyclical pattern. 
As an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, the three-year corpo- 
rate bond rate may not be a good proxy for a short-term interest rate that 
is directly affected by the BOK through operations in the money market. 
Therefore, the interbank call rate was used as the market interest rate in 
the next empirical study. Interbank call rate responses to shocks in money 
supply, inflation, and output growth are presented in figure 9.7. The 
sample was split at the end of 1993. The VAR model was estimated us- 
ing monthly, seasonally adjusted time series for two sample periods: 
1988:8-96:12 and 1988:8-93:12. In the second VAR model, six lags of 
each variable are included for estimation. In response to an increase in 
money supply growth, the interbank call rate rises in the next month and 
then declines to its original level for the subsample period. For the whole 
sample period, the interbank call rate rises steadily in the first four months 
and then declines to its original level in response to an increase in money 
supply growth. The puzzling phenomenon that the interbank call rate rises 
in response to an increase in money supply growth may reflect the ex- 
pected tightening of liquidity in the money market. The BOK used to 
tighten monetary policy when M2 growth rates approached or exceeded 
the annual growth target. 
9.5 Financial Deregulation and the Fragility of Banks 
The rate of return on total assets of nationwide commercial banks con- 
tinued to fall from 0.55 percent in 1990 to 0.23 percent in 1996 (table 9.9). 
The rate of return on total assets of regional banks also declined from 
1.11 percent in 1990 to 0.47 percent in 1996. The sharp drop in bank 
profitability seems to have been due mainly to reduced interest rate mar- 
gins and significant amounts of nonperforming loans held by commercial 
banks, some of which stem from recent credit card businesses. Further- 
more, commercial banks considerably expanded write-offs of nonper- 
forming loans as the bank supervision authorities suggested they do so. 
The share of nonperforming loans of commercial banks steadily de- 
clined from 2.1 percent in 1990 to 0.8 percent in 1996 (table 9.10). Non- 
performing loans, however, include only loans that are classified as “ques- 
tionable loans” (Class 111) and “estimated loss loans” (Class IV) by 
commercial banks.’ The share of “unsound loans,” which includes sub- 
standard loans (Class 11, also commonly known as “fixed loans”) and non- 
performing loans, amounted to 5.1 percent at the end of 1996.4 The share 
3. Questionable loans are defined as those against which actions of collection or other 
measures are needed and that are not secured by collateral. Estimated loss loans are defined 
as bad loans that are judged to be uncollectable. 
4. Fixed loans are defined as those against which actions or other measures are needed 
and that are secured by collateral. 
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Fig. 9.7 Impulse response of interbank call rate to contemporaneous shocks 
in economy 
Note: Response to shocks in ( A )  money supply, (B)  inflation rate, and ( C )  industrial output. 
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Table 9.9 Rate of Return on Total Assets of Commercial Banks, Trust Accounts 
Included (percent) 
Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Top five nationwide 
commercial banks 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.36 0.38 0.22 0.08 
All nationwide 
commercial banks 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.41 0.40 0.28 0.23 
Regional banks 1.11 0.89 0.68 0.67 0.53 0.56 0.47 
Commercial banks 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.45 0.42 0.32 0.26 
Source: Bank of Korea (1996). 
Table 9.10 Share of Nonperforming Loans (I) of Commercial Banks (percent) 
Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
~~ 
Nationwide commercial banks 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 1 .O 0.9 0.8 
Regional banks 1.4 1 .o 0.9 1 .o 0.9 1 .o 0.9 
Commercial banks 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.8 1 .o 0.9 0.8 
Source: Bank of Korea (1997). 
Note: Nonperforming loans (I) (NPL(1)) = Estimated loss + Questionable. 
Table 9.11 Capital Adequacy Ratios of Banks (percent) 
Bank Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Five major banks 7.7 7.4 10.24 10.14 10.46 9.21 8.86 
Nationwide commercial banks 8.5 8.2 10.40 10.40 10.19 8.97 8.97 
Regional banks 13 11.6 16.34 14.86 13.11 11.44 10.15 
Commercial banks 9.1 8.7 11.18 11.00 10.62 9.33 9.14 
Source: Bank of Korea (various issues). 
Note: Capital adequacy ratios are based on Bank for International Settlements criterion from 1992. 
of “abnormal loans,” which includes “caution-needed loans” (Class I) in 
addition to “unsound loans,” was 14.3 percent at the end of 1996. The 
current average nonperforming loan ratio of the six major nationwide 
commercial banks is estimated at around 5 percent by international stan- 
dards, according to the Presidential Commission for Financial Reform 
(1997, 2). 
The recent economic downturn and the inadequate credit assessment 
by banks brought about new nonperforming loans and exacerbated the 
banks’ bad-loan problems and pushed down their capital adequacy ratios 
(table 9.1 I). There was evidence of deterioration in the balance sheets of 
commercial banks. In 1997 nonperforming loans of banks increased sub- 
stantially, as shown in table 9.12. 
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Table 9.12 Share of Nonperforming Loans (11) of Commercial Banks (percent) 
December 
1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
NPL (11) ratio 7.5 6.7 5.6 5.2 3.9 5.8 7.4 
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission, FSC press release, 3 March 1999. 
Note; Nonperforming loans (11) (NPL(I1)) = Substandard + Estimated loss + Questionable. 
Figures from the end of 1996 on include the Housing and Commercial Bank; those from the 
end of 1997 on include the Long-Term Credit Bank and not the five closed banks. 
Rapid increases in nonperforming loans among banks and merchant 
banking corporations resulting from a series of large corporate bankrupt- 
cies have destabilized the financial market and quickly translated into a 
currency crisis. In order to deal with the increase in nonperforming loans, 
the government has established a special institution, the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation, modeled after the Resolution Trust Corpora- 
tion in the United States, which deals with the resolution of bad loans of 
commercial banks. The government has also set up a special bad-loan 
resolution fund of 20 trillion won to finance the operation. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
The strengthening of the international competitiveness of financial mar- 
kets and institutions has become a major financial policy objective in Ko- 
rea as in other industrialized as well as in developing countries. The Presi- 
dential Commission for Financial Reform was established to accelerate 
and to broaden the process of financial liberalization and deregulation in 
early 1997. Priority will be placed on transforming the financial industry 
into a strategic core industry through competition and structural reorgani- 
zation (Presidential Commission for Financial Reform 1997, 9). 
Financial deregulation has led to an irreversible transformation of the 
domestic financial environment. Since interest rate deregulation, the 
difference between market interest rates and bank interest rates has been 
reduced. Commercial banks began to expand their branch networks in 
order to strengthen their retail businesses. Five major nationwide commer- 
cial banks emerged as market leaders in setting prime lending rates in the 
banking market. Smaller banks and regional banks have tended to follow 
the leaders in the banking market in major decisions, which includes set- 
ting prime lending rates and fees for services. A significant change oc- 
curred in bank loan portfolios. Commercial banks have expanded loans 
to small and medium-size firms and households since interest rate deregu- 
lation. Households are now able to obtain loans from financial institutions 
more easily than in the past. Interest rate margins of nationwide commer- 
cial banks came down strikingly between 1990 and 1994. After the interest 
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rate deregulation in 199 1, the market concentration ratio in the banking 
industry steadily declined in the 1990s. Market concentration through 
mergers and acquisitions, however, has not occurred yet in the banking 
market. 
Interest rate elasticity of demand for M2 seemed to increase remarkably 
from 1991 due to interest rate deregulation and financial liberalization. 
Changes in regulations governing financial instruments recently prompted 
portfolio shifts between savings instruments of banks and nonbank finan- 
cial institutions. The portfolio shifts led to unstable demand for M2. Thus 
the monetary authorities decided to replace M2 with MCT, which com- 
prises M2 plus certificates of deposit and trust accounts, as an intermedi- 
ate target variable in 1997. Financial liberalization, however, is likely to 
make the demand for money increasingly unstable. Therefore, there may 
be advantages to moving the monetary objective away from rigid targeting 
of M2 or MCT. Deregulation may necessitate the relinquishment of earlier 
modes of policy implementation that provided some advantages of sim- 
plicity and control to the monetary authorities. 
The recent economic downturn and the inadequate credit assessment 
by banks brought about new nonperforming loans and exacerbated the 
banks’ bad-loan problems. Weaknesses in the structure and performance 
of the corporate governance of commercial banks have surfaced with the 
Hanbo loan scandal in 1997. The deregulation process may involve transi- 
tional risks and costs. Korea’s financial system will not become interna- 
tionally competitive without the presence of some financially and manage- 
rially strong banks and other financial institutions. 
Restrictions on competition in fees and commissions among members 
of the stock exchange and insurance companies still limit the scope for 
price competition in this area of financial services. The government should 
continue to adopt policies that promote and provide more scope for com- 
petition in the financial service market. The government authorities may 
have to increasingly use the instrument of competition rules in order to 
dismantle all sorts of cartel agreements in the financial service industry. 
The government authorities have pursued gradual deregulation and fa- 
vor restructuring financial institutions in several steps to reduce the shocks 
and uncertainties to financial markets. On the other hand, the Presidential 
Commission for Financial Reform recommended a big-bang-type full lib- 
eralization in December 1997. The commission seems to think that such 
liberalization might solve many problems in Korea’s financial markets in 
a single stroke. It is an open question which approach would offer a better 
solution in Korea. It remains to be seen whether the commission’s recom- 
mendation can be implemented in the coming months before the presiden- 
tial election in late 1997. If not, the recommendations might be handed 
over to the next government for implementation. 
Financial Deregulation and Competition in Korea 299 
References 
Bank of Korea. Office of Bank Supervision. Various issues. Bank management sta- 
tistics. Seoul: Bank of Korea. 
Gilbert, R. Alton. 1984. Bank market structure and competition: A survey. Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 16 (November): 617-45. 
Hahm, Joon-Ho, and Duk-Hoon Lee. 1997. Macroeconomic sources of long-term 
interest rate differentials. Journal of Economic Policy (Korea Development Insti- 
tute) 19 (1): 51-98. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 1996. Korea: Selected issues. IMF Staff 
Country Report no. 96/136. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Jacobs, Donald P. 1971. Business loan costs and bank market structure. NBER 
Occasional Paper no. 115. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Kang, Moon-Soo. 1993. Monetary policy implementation under financial liberal- 
ization: The case of Korea. In Financial opening: Policy issues and experiences 
in developing countries, ed. Helmut Reisen and Bernhard Fischer, 201-25. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Kim, Hong-Dal. 1996. Interest rate liberalization and determination of lending 
rates. Monthly Bulletin (Bank of Korea), August: 22-47. 
Kim, Jae-Chun. 1996. Interest rate deregulation and money market development 
in Korea. In Interest rate liberalization and money market development, ed. Has- 
sanali Mehran, Bernard Laurens, and Marc Quintyn, 29-57. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Kim, Pyung-Joo. 1997. Financial reform in Korea. Seoul: Presidential Commission 
for Financial Reform. 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. 1991. MOF Bulletin, no. 97 (September). 
Nam, Sang-Woo. 1994. Korea’s financial reform since the early 1980s. In Financial 
reform: Theory and experience, ed. Gerard Caprio Jr. et al., 184-222. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). 1996. OECD 
economic surveys: Korea, 1995-1 996. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development. 
Presidential Commission for Financial Reform. 1997. Financial reform in Korea: 
Thefirst report. Seoul: Presidential Commission for Financial Reform, April. 
Rhoades, Stephen A. 1982. Structure-performance studies in banking: An updated 
summary and evaluation. Staff Economic Studies no. 19. Washington, D.C.: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
. 1993. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Federal Reserve Bulletin 79 
(March): 188-89. 
Comment Shinji Takagi 
Moon-Soo Kang discusses the effect of bank deregulation on (1) interest 
rate margins, (2) market concentration, and (3) the channel of monetary 
Shinji Takagi is professor of economics at the University of Osaka. 
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policy in Korea. The fundamental question here is this: how should we 
assess the quantitative effect of bank (or banking sector) deregulation? In 
addition to the three criteria the author examines in the text, one can also 
suggest, among others, (4) bank profitability, (5) consumer or depositor 
gains, and (6)  arbitrage with market interest rates as additional criteria. I 
raise these issues because I see no logical necessity that bank deregulation 
must affect some of these quantitative indicators in a particular way. In 
fact, many of them are affected not only by deregulation but also by many 
other factors, including the risk factor, transactions costs, profitability, 
bank behavior, and general macroeconomic conditions. The findings of 
the paper, therefore, are probably specific to the macroeconomic, legal, 
and institutional environment within which Korea’s deregulation policy 
took place. 
On a more basic level, one is struck with a parallelism that exists be- 
tween the experience of Korea and that of Japan. Both Korea and Japan 
took a slow and gradual approach to financial liberalization. Both are now 
contemplating a big bang approach to full liberalization. The parallelism, 
however, ends here. Japan was “forced” to liberalize its financial market 
because of the need to finance large issues of government bonds resulting 
from the widening fiscal deficits in the 1970s and because of the liberaliza- 
tion of cross-border capital flows prompted by sustained current account 
surpluses (and the associated accumulation of foreign assets and foreign 
pressure to open up the domestic capital markets) in the 1980s. In other 
words, necessity was the driving force behind Japan’s financial liberaliza- 
tion. Likewise for the recently announced big bang (in which the financial 
system is to be fully deregulated by the year 2001), the government was 
forced to react to the declining international status of Japanese financial 
markets and the awareness that Japan’s financial industry would be in dan- 
ger of losing international competitiveness entirely. But what is the driving 
force for change in Korea? 
The Japanese experience has been reasonably explainable in terms of 
political economy considerations. Government authorities are reluctant to 
deregulate the financial markets because financial regulation is a signifi- 
cant source of power and authority. Thus deregulation and other institu- 
tional change generally occur only as necessity dictates. In the case of 
Korea, however, there is no such clear picture of forces driving the govern- 
ment authorities to pursue the policy of financial liberalization. Are the 
Korean authorities driven by their awareness that a deregulated financial 
system is inherently superior in terms of resource allocation and other 
efficiency considerations? If so, unlike the Japanese authorities they are 
driven not by necessity but by reason. Reason should be the principle of 
action in all intelligent beings, but experience tells us that it is often not 
sufficient to effect a significant institutional change. Was the first attempt 
at interest rate deregulation abandoned in 1989 precisely because it was 
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conceived by reason and not driven by necessity? If Korea is following the 
dictates of reason or simply the lead of Japan, one cannot help but be a 
little skeptical about the future success of the Korean big bang. 
Comment Sang-Woo Nam 
Financial deregulation in Korea has indeed been very cautious and slow, 
as Moon-Soo Kang states in the paper’s introduction. Kang assesses that 
this policy of gradualism has been pursued in order to give less competi- 
tive financial institutions enough time to adjust to a more competitive 
environment in the financial market. The less competitive financial institu- 
tions include nationwide commercial banks with a heavy burden of non- 
performing loans, which have been the major victims of government in- 
dustrial policy since the early 1970s. To a large extent, the accumulated 
nonperforming loans represent a deadweight loss due to broad govern- 
ment intervention in resource allocation. Unlike in the 1970s, most of 
these nonperforming loans may have resulted from the moral hazard be- 
havior of major chaebols and financial institutions rather than direct gov- 
ernment intervention. However, if the government’s promotion of industry 
and the way the government has handled corporate financial distress and 
defaults in the past have induced chaebols and financial institutions to 
believe that they are “too big to die,” the government should be held re- 
sponsible. The neglect of credit evaluation and the moral hazard behavior 
of banks was also due to the weak governance of the nationwide commer- 
cial banks in the midst of continued government intervention in the man- 
agement of these privatized banks. 
The question is how to deal efficiently with this deadweight loss of non- 
performing loans. More specifically, we have to ask whether gradualism 
has been a cost-effective way of dealing with the deterioration of bank 
loans. Politically, it must have been the most inexpensive way. As the finan- 
cial sector keeps growing in terms of total credit, the share of nonper- 
forming loans in total credit is supposed to be declining as long as the size 
of nonperforming loans remains more or less constant. In this way, it was 
hoped that the problem would ease and, in time, disappear without any 
attention or criticism from the public. The government would then not 
need to admit the failure of past policies because the failures would not 
be exposed explicitly. 
This approach, however, seems to have been fairly expensive economi- 
cally. It has resulted in delays in dealing with insolvent corporations and 
Sang-Woo Nam is professor in the School of International Policy and Management of the 
Korea Development Institute. 
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in continued resource flows to these firms in distress. The practice of loan 
repayment guarantees among the subsidiaries of chaebols has also contrib- 
uted to this phenomenon. More important, the delayed and slow process 
of financial liberalization must have cost the economy a lot. Lack of com- 
petition in the financial sector means inefficiencies in the operation of 
intermediaries and in the allocation of resources among different uses and 
industries. Stronger governance of commercial banks would have eased 
the problem of moral hazard on the part of these banks and chaebols as 
well. Cleaning the balance sheet of banks-in other words, separating the 
nonperforming loans from banks-would have been more cost-effective 
economically. Freed from the legacies of the past, the banking sector could 
have been forced to compete rigorously with nonbank financial institu- 
tions as well as foreign intermediaries on an equal footing. It is indeed 
surprising that there has been little serious discussion about how to deal 
with the deterioration of bank loan portfolios and the potential cost of 
gradualism in (domestic) financial deregulation. Kang mentions this issue 
in both the introduction and the conclusion of the paper but leaves out 
any serious discussion of this important subject. 
The paper seems to evaluate the impact of Korea’s financial deregula- 
tion rather positively in spite of the cautious and slow process of liberaliza- 
tion. The findings include the expansion of commercial bank branch net- 
works, increased loans to small and medium-size firms and consumers, 
reduced interest margins, and a declining market concentration ratio in 
the banking industry. Of these, the expansion of commercial bank branch 
networks may not be desirable if it is simply the result of costly, zero-sum 
efforts to attract deposits when there is no lack of deposit outlets even in 
remote areas with agricultural cooperatives, post offices, and other small 
community-based financial intermediaries. 
The evidence of reduced interest margins after interest rate deregulation 
is not very convincing either. As Kang notes, lending rates have been de- 
regulated faster than deposit rates. This sequence was mainly due to the 
relatively weak impact of lending rate deregulation on the market, rather 
than to its expected effect on fund allocation. As is well known, banks 
generally have ways of circumventing lending rate regulations. For in- 
stance, by requiring borrowers to put a portion of what they borrow in 
deposits (compensating deposit balance), banks can keep their effective 
lending rates close to market rates. Starting in 1991 there seems to have 
been a change in the method of calculating the average balance of check- 
ing accounts that made the average deposit interest rate much higher. It 
was only in November 1991 that the first stage of interest rate deregulation 
went into effect, and only interest rates on time deposits with a maturity 
of three years and over were deregulated. Thus it is hard to believe that 
the higher average deposit interest rate in 1991 was due to interest rate 
deregulation and the consequent increase in competitive pressure for 
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banks. Between 1991 and 1995, the interest margin actually widened from 
2.2 to 3.0 percentage points. 
Similarly, Kang ascribes the declining rate of return on bank assets to 
the narrowing of interest margins and the reduced share of nonperforming 
loans. The real picture seems to be that interest margins widened rather 
than narrowed, and the reduced share of nonperforming loans might sim- 
ply reflect increased write-offs of these loans. In the situation where banks 
were forced to write off large amounts of nonperforming loans and profits 
were squeezed, they might have no other option than widening interest 
margins in order to minimize profit deterioration. 
Finally, the measured interest rate elasticity of demand for money shows 
opposite movements for M2 and M3. This may be due to a deficiency in 
the specification of the money demand equation. As an interest rate vari- 
able, the bank deposit interest rate could also be tried in addition to the 
corporate bond yield for the M2 demand equation. The inflation rate 
might also be important, as it represents the cost of holding money. Speci- 
fication of the equation might be improved when the interest rate (and 
cost) variables are tried in the form ln(100 + r )  (rather than In r),  ln[(100 
+ r)/(100 + rd)], or ln(100 + rP), where rd is the representative bank deposit 
interest rate and rr, is the inflation rate. 
